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Abstract—Millimeter wave offers a sensible solution to the ca-
pacity crunch faced by 5G wireless communications. This paper
comprehensively studies physical layer security in a multi-input
single-output (MISO) millimeter wave system where multiple
single-antenna eavesdroppers are randomly located. Concerning
the specific propagation characteristics of millimeter wave, we
investigate two secure transmission schemes, namely maximum
ratio transmitting (MRT) beamforming and artificial noise (AN)
beamforming. Specifically, we first derive closed-form expressions
of the connection probability for both schemes. We then analyze
the secrecy outage probability (SOP) in both non-colluding
eavesdroppers and colluding eavesdroppers scenarios. Also, we
maximize the secrecy throughput under a SOP constraint, and
obtain optimal transmission parameters, especially the power
allocation between AN and the information signal for AN beam-
forming. Numerical results are provided to verify our theoretical
analysis. We observe that the density of eavesdroppers, the
spatially resolvable paths of the destination and eavesdroppers all
contribute to the secrecy performance and the parameter design
of millimeter wave systems.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, millimeter wave, multi-
path, stochastic geometry, artificial noise, secrecy outage, secrecy
throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
Driven by an increasing number of smart devices and
wireless data applications, an explosive growth of demand
for spectrum in wireless communications appears during the
past years. Exploiting millimeter wave becomes a promising
approach for providing plentiful spectrum resources to im-
prove the system capacity [1], [2]. Following this trend, the
study on millimeter wave communications has attracted great
research affords. Millimeter wave channel modeling [3], [4],
beamforming schemes [5]-[9] and network performance [10],
[11] have been investigated intensively in the past few years.
It becomes a promising candidate for the 5G cellular system.
Given the open feature of the wireless channels, security
is a significant concern when designing wireless transmission
schemes. Physical layer security has become a popular way to
improve the secrecy performance of wireless communication
systems by utilizing wireless channel characteristics [12]-[14].
Thanks to the application of multi-antenna techniques, physi-
cal layer security is greatly enhanced in [15], [16]. With mul-
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tiple antennas, the transmitter can use transmit beamforming
either to enhance the legitimate user’s channel, i.e., maximum
ratio transmitting (MRT) beamforming [17], or to deteriorate
eavesdroppers’ channels by emitting artificial noise (AN), i.e.,
AN beamforming [18], [19]. Also, transmit antenna selection
technique can be exploited as an effective approach to improve
the quality of the legitimate user’s channel [20]. When de-
signing secure transmission schemes, reducing secrecy outage
probability (SOP) [17], [20] and increasing secrecy throughput
[19] are two significant goals.
In wiretap scenarios, eavesdroppers are always passive and
their locations are hard to acquire in practice. To model
the unknown locations of potential eavesdroppers, stochastic
geometry theory has provided a powerful tool recently, with
which eavesdroppers’ positions can be represented by a spatial
distribution such as a Poisson point process (PPP) [21]-[23].
This makes the secure transmission scheme design and secrecy
performance evaluation possible in the wireless systems with
potentially unknown eavesdroppers.
We should point out that, the wireless channel significantly
influences the design and analysis of physical layer secu-
rity, and the millimeter wave channel is truly different from
the traditional microwave channel which has rich scattering.
Based on the measurements conducted in New York City, the
ray cluster channel model, constituted by several clusters of
propagation paths, is built for millimeter wave systems [4].
This model is further adopted in [5]-[8] to design and analyze
millimeter wave beamforming schemes. Therefore, the major
concern for the implementation of physical layer security
in millimeter wave communication systems is the specific
propagation characteristics of millimeter wave, which can be
described as follows. Firstly, due to the sparse multipaths and
scattering of the millimeter wave propagation environment,
traditional statistically independent fading distributions are no
longer suitable to model the millimeter wave channel. Chan-
nels in the millimeter wave band are correlated fading rather
than independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh.
Secondly, the small carrier wavelength of millimeter wave
enables the realization of large antenna arrays, which can pro-
duce extremely high beamforming gain and directionality [24].
This helps to improve the secrecy performance of millimeter
wave transmission [25].
Driven by the new propagation features, studies on secure
transmissions in millimeter wave systems spring up, both in
point-to-point transmissions [26]-[32] and networks [33]-[35].
Specifically, for the point-to-point millimeter wave systems,
switched array techniques are utilized in [26], [27], where
2a subset of transmit antennas are randomly selected to emit
signals with every symbol period. This results in a clear con-
stellation in the legitimate user’s direction and a high symbol
error rate in undesired directions. This method that needs only
a single RF chain is easy to implement in millimeter wave
systems. However, the switching speed to be matched at per-
symbol rate leads to a huge system overhead, and the antenna
sparsity caused by switching makes the secure transmission
vulnerable to attacking [36]. Hybrid beamforming design for
millimeter wave systems to resist eavesdropping is studied
in [28], [29]. Furthermore, in our previous work [30]-[32],
we design beamforming schemes and analyze secrecy perfor-
mance for the millimeter wave system which contains only
one eavesdropper. For the scope of millimeter wave networks,
the authors in [33]-[35] analyze the secrecy performance of
cellular or Ad hoc networks under the stochastic geometry
framework. Both the noise-limited and AN-assisted cellular
networks are considered in [33]. The tradeoff between the
connection outage probability and secrecy outage probability
is investigated for a microwave and millimeter wave hybrid
cellular network in [34]. The impact of random blockages
and antenna gain on the secrecy performance of Ad hoc
networks is analyzed in [35]. These three works focus on the
network-wide performance analysis, and the beam pattern is
approximated by a sectored antenna model for mathematical
tractability.
In all the aforementioned studies, they either do not con-
sider multipath transmission, or do not investigate the effect
of multiple randomly distributed eavesdroppers. To the best
of our knowledge, no previous work has provided secure
transmission schemes and comprehensive secrecy performance
analysis under a more practical ray cluster channel model
that characterizes multipath propagation for a millimeter wave
system with the stochastic geometry framework. So far, how
to safeguard the point-to-point millimeter wave system against
randomly located eavesdroppers under a more practical mil-
limeter wave channel model is still unknown, which motivates
our work.
A. Our Work and Contributions
In this paper, we study physical layer security in a multi-
input single-output (MISO) millimeter wave system con-
sidering multipath propagation under a stochastic geometry
framework, where the locations of multiple single-antenna
eavesdroppers are modeled as a homogeneous PPP. Connec-
tion probability, SOP and secrecy throughput are studied to
evaluate the secrecy performance of the transmission schemes.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
1) In the presence of multiple randomly located eavesdrop-
pers, we investigate two transmission schemes, namely MRT
beamforming and AN beamforming, under the discrete angular
domain channel model which characterized by multiple spa-
tially resolvable paths. We obtain the probability distribution
function (PDF) for the number of overlapped common channel
paths between the destination and an arbitrary eavesdropper to
facilitate the secrecy performance analysis.
2) We derive the closed-form connection probability for
both transmission schemes and evaluate the impact of the
number of destination’s resolvable paths on the connection.
Then we obtain the closed-form expressions of SOP for the
non-colluding eavesdroppers scenario and the accurate ap-
proximation of SOP for the colluding eavesdroppers scenario.
In addition, we maximize the secrecy throughput for both
schemes, and derive the optimal power allocation between AN
and the information signal for the AN scheme. we observe
that more power should be allocated to AN in the dense
eavesdroppers scenario or in the situation where the number of
the destination’s resolvable paths or that of the eavesdropper’s
resolvable paths is large.
3) We reveal that AN beamforming has a better secrecy
performance than MRT beamforming when the number of the
eavesdropper’s resolvable paths is large, the density of eaves-
droppers is large or the transmit power is high. Otherwise,
MRT beamforming as a simple method shows its superiority.
Furthermore, we find that the decrease of the number of the
destination’s resolvable paths is beneficial for improving the
secrecy performance in both beamforming schemes, while the
impact of the number of the eavesdropper’s resolvable paths
on the secrecy throughput are different between two schemes.
B. Organization and Notations
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we build
the channel model, analyze spatially resolvable paths, and
describe performance metrics. In Section III, we propose two
secure transmission schemes against randomly located eaves-
droppers. In Sections IV and V, we analyze the connection
probability, the SOP and the secrecy throughput for both
schemes. In Section VI, we provide numerical results to verify
our theoretical analysis. In Section VII, we conclude our paper.
We use the following notations in this paper: bold upper-
case (lowercase) letters denote matrices (vectors). (·)∗, (·)T ,
(·)H , | · |, ‖ · ‖, P{·} and EA{·} denote conjugate, trans-
pose, conjugate transpose, absolute value, Euclidean norm,
probability, and mathematical expectation with respect to A,
respectively. CN (µ, σ2), Exp(λ) and Gamma(N, λ) denote
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with mean
µ and variance σ2, exponential distribution with parameter λ,
and gamma distribution with parametersN and λ, respectively.
CM×N denotes the space of allM×N matrices with complex-
valued elements. Z+ denotes positive integer domain. log(·),
lg(·) and ln(·) denote base-2, base-10 and natural logarithms,
respectively. fu(·), Fu(·) and F−1u (·) denote the PDF, cumu-
lative distribution function (CDF) of u and inverse function
of Fu(·), respectively. The intersection, union and difference
between two sets Ω1 and Ω2 are denoted by Ω1∩Ω2, Ω1∪Ω2
and Ω1\Ω2, respectively. Ei(−x) =
∫∞
x
e−t
t dt with x > 0.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a millimeter wave system where a transmit-
ter communicates with a destination while randomly located
eavesdroppers attempt to intercept the information. The trans-
mitter is equipped with Nt antennas, the destination and
3eavesdroppers are all equipped with single antenna1. Without
loss of generality, we assume the transmitter is located at the
origin and the destination is located at coordinate (rd, 0). As
shown in Fig. 1(a), eavesdroppers are located according to a
homogeneous PPP Φe of density λ on the 2-D plane with the
kth eavesdropper having a distance rk from the transmitter.
A. Discrete Angular Domain Channel Model
Due to the sparse characteristics of the millimeter wave
propagation environment, millimeter wave channels can be
described by a ray cluster based spatial channel model [4]-
[8]. The channel is assumed to be a sum of the contributions
of Nc clusters with Nr paths in each cluster and can be
formulated as h =
√
β
NcNr
∑
lc
∑
lr
glc,lra(Θlc,lr)
H , where
β is the average path loss between the transmitter and the
receiver, glc,lr is the complex gain of the l
th
r path in the
lthc cluster, a(Θlc,lr ) is the normalized array response at the
azimuth angle of departure (AOD) of θlc,lr , and Θlc,lr ,
sin(θlc,lr ). When a uniform linear array (ULA) is adopted,
the normalized array response can be described as a(Θ) =
1√
Nt
[
1, e−j
2πd
λ
Θ, e−j2
2πd
λ
Θ, · · · , e−j(Nt−1) 2πdλ Θ
]T
, where d
is the antenna spacing, λ is the wavelength, and generally
d = λ2 .
Based on the ray cluster model, in order to conduct the
theoretical analysis of the transmission schemes, the millimeter
wave channel is modeled as a discrete angular domain channel
model in existing literature [3], [37], [38] and our previous
work [30], which can be described as
h =
√
1
L
r−
α
2 gUH , (1)
where g = [g1, g2, · · · , gNt] is the complex gain vector, r−α2
is the average path loss, r is the distance between the trans-
mitter and the receiver, U , [a(Ψ1), a(Ψ2), · · · , a(ΨNt)] is
the spatially orthogonal basis with Ψi , 1M (i−1− Nt−12 ) and
M = Nt
d
λ . This model is based on the principle that every
aperture-limited system has a finite angular resolution [37].
Since paths with Θ differing by less than 1M are not resolvable
by the array, the angular domain can be sampled at a fixed
spacing 1M and represented by the spatially orthogonal basis
U. Experimental results in [4], [39] show that the millimeter
wave channel most likely contains only one cluster where the
overwhelming proportion of transmit power is concentrated
on. Therefore, we assume that signals are transmitted through
one cluster and all the AODs of paths are distributed within the
angular range [θmin, θmax]. If Ψi ∈ [sin(θmin), sin(θmax)], the
ith column of U (the ith orthogonal basis vector) represents a
spatially resolvable path and we assume that the ith complex
gain gi is a complex Gaussian coefficient with gi ∼ CN (0, 1);
otherwise, gi = 0 [4], [24], [30]. L is defined as the number
of spatially resolvable paths with L < Nt. Then the channels
of the destination and the kth eavesdropper can be described
1This assumption is used for tractability. In practice, multiple receive
antennas are equipped and they will form a receive beam, which is equivalent
to a directional single antenna. This will not influence the analysis performed
in this paper. Similar assumption has also been adopted by [5], [26], [27],
[29]-[34], etc.
−100 −50 0 50 100
−100
−50
0
50
100
 
 
Transmitter
Destination
Eavesdroppers
(a) Locations of randomly distributed eavesdroppers
d:
k:
Transmitter
Eavesdropper
Destination
p:
c:
n:
thk
D
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
(b) Description of spatially resolvable paths
Fig. 1. Millimeter wave system model with stochastic geometry framework.
as hd =
√
1
Ld
r
−α2
d gdU
H and hk =
√
1
Le
r
−α2
k gkU
H , where
Ld and Le are the numbers of the destination’s and each
eavesdropper’s resolvable paths, respectively.
We assume the AODs of all the destination’s paths and
those of the kth eavesdropper’s paths are distributed within
the angular range [θd,min, θd,max] and [θk,min, θk,max] respec-
tively. As shown in Fig. 1(b), we define the set Ωd ,
{Id,i|Id,i ∈ Z+,ΨId,i ∈ [sin(θd,min), sin(θd,max)], Id,1 <
Id,2 < · · · < Id,Ld}, where Id,i is an index of the orthog-
onal basis vector which represents a destination’s spatially
resolvable path. Define the set Ωk , {Ik,i|Ik,i ∈ Z+,ΨIk,i ∈
[sin(θk,min), sin(θk,max)], Ik,1 < Ik,2 < · · · < Ik,Le}, where
Ik,i is an index of the orthogonal basis vector which rep-
resents a resolvable path of the kth eavesdropper. Define
Ω = {1, 2, · · · , Nt}, Ωa , Ωd = Ω\Ωd, Ωc,k , Ωd ∩ Ωk
and Ωp,k , Ωd\Ωc,k, Ωn,k , Ωk\Ωc,k. Also, we denote Lc,k
as the number of the overlapped common paths between the
destination and the kth eavesdropper. For notational brevity,
we omit k from Lc,k, Ωc,k, Ωp,k and Ωn,k, and treat Lc,
Ωc, Ωp and Ωn as functions of k by default. We define the
function S(B,Ωs) to generate a matrix whose columns are
selected from B, and Ωs contains all the selected columns’
indexes. Define g̺ν , S(g̺,Ων) ∈ C1×Lν , where ̺ ∈ {d, k},
ν ∈ {c, p, n, a}, and Lν is the cardinality of Ων .
We assume that the instantaneous channel state information
4(CSI) of the destination is perfectly known at the transmitter
[18], [19]. Since eavesdroppers passively receive signals, their
instantaneous CSIs are unknown, whereas the distribution of
gk is available.
B. Spatially Resolvable Paths
Unlike the traditional wireless channels with rich scatter-
ing, the millimeter wave channel involves a limited angular
coverage which is represented by the directions of propa-
gation paths. As we have demonstrated in [30], the secrecy
performance of the millimeter wave system is dramatically
influenced by Lc, which is the number of the overlapped
common paths between the eavesdropper’s and the destina-
tion’s spatially resolvable paths. When Lc becomes larger, the
correlation between the channel of the destination and that
of the eavesdropper is larger. More confidential information is
leaked to the eavesdropper so that the secrecy performance will
be poorer. However, under the stochastic geometry framework,
it is hard to get the exact value of Lc due to the randomness of
eavesdroppers’ locations and the lack of eavesdroppers’ CSIs.
Fortunately, we derive the PDF of Lc in the following lemma,
which will be extensively used in subsequent sections.
Lemma 1: The PDF of Lc can be given by
p(Lc) =


∑Lu
i=Ll
ωi
π
, Lc = Ll,
2ωLc
π
, Lc = 1, 2, · · · , Ll − 1,
1−
Ll∑
i=1
p(i), Lc = 0,
(2)
where ωi , arcsin
(
ΨNt−Ld
2 +i+1
)
− arcsin
(
ΨNt−Ld
2 +i
)
,
Ll , min{Ld, Le} and Lu , max{Ld, Le}.
Proof 1: Eavesdroppers are located according to a homoge-
neous PPP so that the angles of eavesdroppers’ locations are
uniformly distributed within the range [−π2 , π2 ]. In order to get
the probability of Lc = m, m ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,min{Ld, Le}}, we
need to know the angular range Υm which satisfies that, the
destination and the kth eavesdropper will have m overlapped
common resolvable paths when the kth eavesdropper is lo-
cated in Υm. In other words, [θk,min, θk,max] should cover m
destination’s spatially resolvable paths, where [θk,min, θk,max]
is the angular range where AODs of the kth eavesdropper’
paths are distributed in as discussed in the last subsection.
Then we can obtain the probability p(m) = W(Υm)π , whereW(·) denotes the width of an angular range. With this idea in
mind, we move the kth eavesdropper to find out the angular
range Υm as shown in Fig. 2.
Since the destination is located at (rd, 0) and with Ld
resolvable paths, we have Ωd = {Nt−Ld2 + 1, Nt−Ld2 +
2, · · · , Nt+Ld2 − 1, Nt+Ld2 } where Ωd,i = Nt−Ld2 + i. Define
the angular range ∆i ,[
arcsin
(
ΨNt−Ld
2 +i
)
, arcsin
(
ΨNt−Ld
2 +i+1
)]
, and the width
ωi ,W(∆i) = arcsin
(
ΨNt−Ld
2 +i+1
)
−arcsin
(
ΨNt−Ld
2 +i
)
.
We find that ∆i describes the angular range between the i
th
and the (i + 1)th spatially resolvable paths of the destination
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Fig. 2. Distribution for the number of the overlapped common paths between
the destination and the kth eavesdropper. The pink area shows the angular
range [θd,min, θd,max] where AODs of the destination’s paths are distributed
in, and the green area shows the angular range [θk,min, θk,max] where AODs
of the kth eavesdropper’s paths are distributed in. Red solid lines are the
spatially resolvable paths of the destination. Each red dashed line represents
an angle in U but not the spatially resolvable path of the destination. (a)
describes the situation that Lc = 1, which is similar as all the situations when
Lc < Ll. (b) and (c) describe the situation that Lc = Ll with Ld > Le and
Ld < Le respectively.
5when 1 ≤ i ≤ Ld − 1. Due to the symmetry of the sine
function and the definition of Ψi, we have ωi = ωLd−i.
As shown in Fig. 2(a), if θk,max is located within ∆1 or
θk,min is located within ∆Ld−1, we have Lc = 1. Thus we
derive the PDF of Lc = 1, which is p(1) =
ω1+ω(Ld−1)
π =
2ω1
π .
Then we analyze two different cases Ld ≥ Le and Ld < Le.
1) Ld ≥ Le
In this case, 0 ≤ Lc ≤ Le. From the analysis of Lc = 1
given above, we derive the PDFs p(Lc) =
2ωLc
π , Lc =
1, 2, · · · , Le − 1 by analogy. The situation when Lc = Le is
special. As shown in Fig. 2(b), when θk,max ∈ ∆Le∪∆Le+1∪
· · · ∪∆Ld , Lc = Le, hence we have p(Lc) =
∑Ld
i=Le
ωi
π .
2) Ld < Le
In this case, 0 ≤ Lc ≤ Ld, and we derive the PDFs p(Lc) =
2ωLc
π , Lc = 1, 2, · · · , Ld − 1. As shown in Fig. 2(c), when
θk,max ∈ ∆Ld ∪∆Ld+1 ∪ · · · ∪∆Le , Lc = Ld, hence we have
p(Lc) =
∑Le
i=Ld
ωi
π .
Combining the above two cases completes the proof.
C. Wiretap Encoding Scheme and Performance Metrics
We consider both non-colluding eavesdroppers and collud-
ing eavesdroppers scenarios. In non-colluding eavesdroppers
scenario, each eavesdropper individually decodes confidential
messages and the equivalent signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) of the wiretap channel can be expressed as
ξe = maxek∈Φe ξk, where ξk is the received SINR of the
kth eavesdropper. In colluding eavesdropper scenario, eaves-
droppers jointly decode confidential messages with maximum
ratio combining reception and ξe =
∑
ek∈Φe ξk. Then the
capacities of the destination’s channel and the wiretap channel
are Cd = log(1 + ξd) and Ce = log(1 + ξe). Adopting the
well-known Wyner’s wiretap encoding scheme, we denote the
codeword rate and secrecy rate as Rt and Rs. In addition,
we define Re , Rt −Rs as the rate redundancy to resist the
interception. We analyze the following metrics to evaluate the
secrecy performance of transmission schemes.
Connection probability: Only if Cd > Rt, the destination
is able to decode the confidential message correctly. This cor-
responds to a reliable connection event. We define connection
probability as
Pc = P{Cd > Rt}. (3)
Secrecy outage probability: If Ce > Re, perfect secrecy
is broken and a secrecy outage occurs. We adopt an on-off
transmission scheme proposed in [19], where the transmitter
decides whether to transmit or not based on the instantaneous
CSI of the destination. Throughout the paper, for notational
brevity, we define µ , ‖gd‖2 as the overall channel gain
of the destination and δ as the transmission threshold. Since
the channel gain µ varies from time to time, the transmitter
emits signals only when µ > δ; otherwise, the transmission
suspends. The SOP is defined as
Pso = P{Ce > Rt −Rs|µ}, ∀µ > δ. (4)
Secrecy throughput: Secrecy throughput is defined as the
effective average transmission rate of the confidential message,
which is formulated as
τ = Eµ [Rs(µ)] , (5)
where Rs(µ) = 0 for µ ≤ δ.
III. TRANSMISSION SCHEMES
In this section, we propose two transmission schemes,
namely MRT beamforming and AN beamforming, to resist
overhearing of multiple randomly located eavesdroppers.
A. MRT Beamforming
By exploiting MRT beamforming, the signals received
at the destination and the kth eavesdropper are yMRTd =√
Phdw1s + nd and y
MRT
k =
√
Phkw1s + nk, where
w1 = h
H
d /‖hd‖ is the beamforming vector, P is the total
transmit power, s is the information bearing signal with
E[|s|2] = 1, nd and nk are i.i.d. additive white Gaussian
noise with nd ∼ CN (0, σ2n) and nk ∼ CN (0, σ2n). We define
µc,k , ‖gdc‖2 and µp,k , ‖gdp‖2 as the destination’s channel
gain of the common paths and the non-common paths with the
kth eavesdropper. For notational brevity, we omit k from µc,k
and µp,k, and treat them as functions of k by default. We easily
find that µ = µc + µp. Then the SNRs of the destination and
the kth eavesdropper can be respectively described as
ξMRTd =
Pr−αd
σ2nLd
‖gdUH‖2 = cµr−αd , (6)
ξMRTk =
Pr−αk |gkUHUgHd |2
σ2nLe‖gdUH‖2
=
aµcr
−α
k |gkc g
H
dc
‖gdc‖ |2
µ
. (7)
where a , PLeσ2n and c ,
P
Ldσ2n
. We find that gk,ig
∗
d,i 6= 0 only
if i ∈ Ωd ∩ Ωk, i.e., i ∈ Ωc. Thus we have gkgHd = gkcgHdc.
B. AN Beamforming
Based on the CSI of the destination, we design the AN
beamforming matrix as W2 = S(U,Ωa) to transmit AN to
the null space of the destination’s channel. Since Ωa = Ω\Ωd,
we have hdW2 = 0, hence the destination is not influ-
enced by AN. We observe that by leveraging the specific
propagation characteristics of millimeter wave, we form the
null space only through selecting some columns from U,
which is really simple to operate. Then signals received by
the destination and the kth eavesdropper can be described as
yANd =
√
ηPhdw1s +
√
(1−η)P
Nt−Ld hdW2z + nd and y
AN
k =√
ηPhkw1s+
√
(1−η)P
Nt−Ld hkW2z+nk, where z ∈ C(Nt−Ld)×1
is the AN bearing signal with E[zzH ] = INt−Ld , η is the
power allocation ratio of the information signal power to
the total transmit power with 0 ≤ η ≤ 1. When η = 1,
AN beamforming is equavalent to MRT beamforming where
information signal is transmitted with full power. The SINRs
6of the destination and the kth eavesdropper can be respectively
formulated as
ξANd =
ηPr−αd
σ2nLd
‖gdUH‖2 = ηcµr−αd , (8)
ξANk =
ηPr−α
k
Leµ
|gkUHUgHd |2
(1−η)Pr−α
k
(Nt−Ld)Le ‖gkUHW2‖2 + σ2n
=
ηaµcr
−α
k
µ |gkc g
H
dc
‖gdc‖ |2
(1−η)ar−α
k
(Nt−Ld) ‖gkn‖2 + 1
. (9)
By denoting gkU
HW2 =
[
χ1, χ2, · · · , χ(Nt−Ld)
]
, we have
χj =
∑Nt
i=1 gk,ia(Ψi)
Hw2,j . Since W2 = S(U,Ωa) and U
is a unitary matrix, we get gkU
HW2 = gka. Since Ωn =
Ωk\Ωc, by getting rid of those zero elements in gka, we have
‖gka‖ = ‖gkn‖.
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF MRT BEAMFORMING
In this section, we analyze the secrecy performance in
terms of the connection probability, the SOP and the secrecy
throughput for MRT beamforming.
A. Connection Probability
Since µ ∼ Gamma(Ld, 1), connection probability of MRT
beamforming defined in (3) can be described as
Pc = P{Cd > Rt} = P{ξMRTd > 2Rt − 1}
=
1
Γ(Ld)
Γ
(
Ld,
(2Rt − 1)rαd
c
)
,
(10)
where Γ(·) is the gamma function, and Γ(·, ·) denotes the
upper incomplete gamma function with Γ(n, x) = (n −
1)! e−x
∑n−1
m=0
xm
m! .
B. Secrecy Outage Performance
1) Non-Colluding Eavesdroppers: We first derive the CDF
of ξMRTk in (7). Define u ,
∣∣∣gkc gHdc‖gdc‖
∣∣∣2, Since each element
of gkc follows a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit
variance, which is independent of the unit-norm vector
g
H
dc
‖gdc‖ ,
we have u ∼ Exp(1). The CDF of ξMRTk is given by
Fξk(x) = P
{
aµcr
−α
k
µ
u < x
}
= 1− e−
µxrα
k
aµc . (11)
From the definition of µc, we find that µc ∼
Gamma(Lc, 1). Then the CDF of ξe can be calculated as
Fξe(x) = P
{
max
ek∈Φe
ξk < x
}
= EΦe,{µc}
[ ∏
ek∈Φe
P {ξk < x}
]
(a)
= exp
{
−λ
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
Eµc
{
e−
µxrα
k
aµc
}
rkdθdrk
}
= exp
{
−πλΓ
(
2
α
+ 1
)(µx
a
)− 2
α
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)
×Eµc
{(
1
µc
)− 2
α
}}
= exp
{
−πλΓ
(
2
α
+ 1
)(µx
a
)− 2
α
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)
Γ(Lc +
2
α )
Γ(Lc)
}
,
(12)
where (a) holds for the probability generating functional
lemma (PGFL) over PPP [41]. We need to mention that
when Lc = 0, gkc and g
H
dc in (7) both equal to 0, hence
we have ξk = 0 and P{ξk < x} = 1. Since the formula∏
ek∈Φe
P{ξk < x} is a multiplication operation, the case Lc = 0
does not contribute to Fξe . Therefore, we only consider Lc
from 1 to Ll.
With the CDF of ξe, we obtain the SOP defined in (4) as
Pso(µ) = P{Ce > Cd −Rs|µ}
= P
{
ξMRTe >
ξMRTd − (T − 1)
T
}
= 1− exp
{
−πλΓ
(
2
α
+ 1
)(
µ[cµr−αd − (T − 1)]
aT
)− 2
α
×
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)
Γ(Lc +
2
α )
Γ(Lc)
}
.
(13)
where T , 2Rs .
2) Colluding Eavesdroppers: In this scenario,
secrecy outage probability can be written by
Pso(µ) = P
{
a
µ
∑
ek∈Φe µcur
−α
k >
cµr−α
d
−(T−1)
T
}
=
P
{
Ie >
µ[cµr−α
d
−(T−1)]
aT
}
, where Ie ,
∑
ek∈Φe µcur
−α
k . We
first calculate the Laplace transform of Ie by
LIe(s) = EΦe,u,µc
[
e
−s∑ek∈Φe µcur
−α
k
]
= EΦe
{ ∏
ek∈Φe
Eu,µc
[
exp
(−sµcur−αk )]
}
(b)
= exp
{
−λ
Ll∑
Lc=1
2πp(Lc)Eu,µc
×
[∫ ∞
0
[
1− exp (−sµcur−αk )] rkdrk
]}
= exp
{
−πλ
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)s
2
αΓ(1− 2
α
)Eu
(
u
2
α
)
Eµc
(
µ
2
α
c
)}
= exp
{
−πλs 2αΓ(1− 2
α
)Γ(1 +
2
α
)
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)
Γ(Lc +
2
α )
Γ(Lc)
}
,
(14)
where (b) holds for PGFL over PPP.
After deriving LIe(s), we can obtain the CDF of Ie through
inverse Laplace transform, and then get the SOP. However,
inverse Laplace transform causes considerable calculation
complexity and induces analysis intractable. Therefore, we
provide an approximation of Pso in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The SOP in the scenario of colluding eaves-
droppers for MRT beamforming can be approximated as
Pso '
N∑
n=0
(
N
n
)
(−1)nLIe
(
qaTn
µ[cµr−αd − (T − 1)]
)
, (15)
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Fig. 3. SOP versus Rs for different N ’s, with Nt = 100, P = 0dBm,
rd = 50m, Ld = 20, Le = 20, α = 4 and λ = 10
−5.
where LIe(s) is given by (14), q , N(N !)− 1N and N is
defined as the number of terms used in approximation.
Proof 2: Defining ι as a normalized gamma random variable
with the shape parameter N , we have
Pso(µ) = P
{
aT Ie
µ[cµr−αd − (T − 1)]
> 1
}
(c)≈ P
{
aT Ie
µ[cµr−αd − (T − 1)]
> ι
}
(d)
'
{
1− exp
[
− qaT Ie
µ[cµr−αd − (T − 1)]
]}N
,
(16)
where (c) holds for the fact that a normalized gamma random
variable converges to identity when its shape parameter goes
to infinity, and (d) follows the CDF bound of a normalized
gamma random variable [10], [33]. By using binomial expan-
sion, we obtain the tight lower bound of Pso given in (15).
As shown in Fig. 3, Pso given in Theorem 1 is more similar
to the simulation results when N becomes larger, and we get
a good approximation when N increases to 5. Thus we use
N = 5 in the following numerical analysis. In addition, we
find that Pso increases when Rs increases. The underlying
reason is that when we set a higher Rs, the rate redundancy
Re = Rt −Rs which is utilized to against the eavesdropping
becomes lower and the secrecy outage requirement Ce > Re
is easier to meet.
C. Secrecy Throughput Maximization
In this subsection, we maximize the secrecy throughput
subject to a tolerable SOP constraint in the non-colluding
eavesdroppers scenario. We first maximize Rs(µ) and formu-
late the optimization problem as
max
Rt,δ
Rs(µ),
s.t. 0 < Rs(µ) < Rt ≤ Cd, (17a)
Pso(µ) ≤ ǫ, (17b)
where ǫ ∈ [0, 1] is the SOP threshold. Following the def-
inition formula of the SOP in (4), the SOP constraint can
be rewritten as Pso(µ) = 1 − Fξe(2Rt−Rs − 1) ≤ ǫ. Since
Fξe(x) is a monotonically increasing function, we obtain
Rs ≤ Rt − log(1 + F−1ξe (1 − ǫ)), where F−1ξe (·) denotes the
inverse function of Fξe(·). As Rt should not exceed Cd, we
set Rt equal to Cd to achieve a maximum Rs, which is
R∗s(µ) = [Cd − log(1 + F−1ξe (1− ǫ))]+. (18)
From (12), by denoting ρ , F−1ξe (1 − ǫ), we have ρ = a̟µ
with ̟ ,
[
−πλΓ(
2
α
+1)
ln(1−ǫ)
∑Ll
Lc=1
p(Lc)
Γ(Lc+
2
α
)
Γ(Lc)
]α
2
. In addi-
tion, in order to obtain a positive R∗s , Cd > log(1+ ρ) should
be satisfied. Since Cd = log(1+cµr
−α
d ), the maximum Rs(µ)
of MRT beamforming can be given by
R∗s(µ) = log
1 + cµr−αd
1 + ρ
, (19)
with the transmission constraint µ > δ =
√
z1rαd
c , where z1 ,
̟a = ρµ, and δ is the transmission threshold. According to
the on-off transmission scheme, the transmitter radiates signals
with R∗s(µ) only when µ > δ; otherwise, the transmitter keeps
silence and we set Rs(µ) = 0. After obtaining R
∗
s(µ), we
calculate the maximum secrecy throughput according to (5).
Theorem 2: The maximum secrecy throughput of MRT
beamforming can be given by
τ∗ =
Ld−1∑
m=0
e−δδLd−1−m
Γ(Ld −m)
[
V
(
1
δ
)
+ V
(
cr−αd
1 + cr−αd δ
)
−V
(
1
δ + z1
)
+ log
δ(1 + cr−αd δ)
δ + z1
]
,
(20)
where V (x) = 1ln 2
∑m
n=1
1
(m−n)! [
(−1)m−n−1
xm−n e
1
x Ei(− 1x ) +∑m−n
k=1 (k − 1)!(− 1x)m−n−k].
Proof 3: Please see Appendix A.
Corollary 1: τ∗ monotonically decreases with rd and λ,
while monotonically increases with ǫ.
Proof 4: From τ∗ =
∫∞
δ R
∗
s(x)fµ(x)dx =∫∞
δ log
1+cxr−α
d
1+
z1
x
fµ(x)dx, we have
∂τ∗
∂δ < 0,
∂τ∗
∂z1
< 0
and ∂τ
∗
∂rd
< 0, hence we derive dτ
∗
dz1
= ∂τ
∗
∂δ
dδ
dz1
+ ∂τ
∗
∂z1
< 0.
Therefore, we obtain dτ
∗
dλ =
dτ∗
dz1
dz1
dλ < 0,
dτ∗
dǫ =
dτ∗
dz1
dz1
dǫ > 0
and dτ
∗
drd
= ∂τ
∗
∂δ
dδ
drd
+ ∂τ
∗
∂rd
< 0.
Corollary 1 implies that MRT beamforming achieves higher
secrecy throughput in a sparser eavesdroppers scenario, under
a more moderate SOP constraint, or when the distance between
the destination and the transmitter is smaller.
Corollary 2: At the high transmit power regime, i.e., P →
∞, The maximum secrecy throughput of MRT beamforming
is given in (21), and is independent of P .
τ∗ =
Ld−1∑
m=0
e−δδLd−1−m
Γ(Ld −m) V
(
1
δ
)
. (21)
Proof 5: When P → ∞, we have a → ∞ and c → ∞.
Following (19), lim
P→∞
R∗s(µ) = log
cµ2r−α
d
a̟ = log
µ2Ler
−α
d
Ld̟
.
By exploiting the same integration method as Theorem 2,
we derive the result given in (21). Since δ =
√
̟Ldrαd
Le
is
independent of P , we have that τ∗ is independent of P when
P →∞.
8V. SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF AN BEAMFORMING
In this section, we first investigate the connection and
secrecy outage performance of AN beamforming. Then we
maximize the secrecy throughput under a given SOP constraint
and derive the optimal power allocation ratio η∗.
A. Connection Probability
Given ξANd = ηcµr
−α
d , from (10), the connection probabil-
ity of AN beamforming can be given by
Pc = 1
Γ(Ld)
Γ
(
Ld,
(2Rt − 1)rαd
ηc
)
. (22)
B. Secrecy Outage Performance
1) Non-Colluding Eavesdroppers: Define v , ‖gkn‖2, we
have v ∼ Gamma(Le − Lc, 1). Since Ωc ∩Ωn = Ø, u and v
are independent to each other. The CDF of ξANk can be given
by
Fξk(x) = 1− Ev
[
e
− (1−η)µx
ηµc(Nt−Ld)
v− µxr
α
k
ηaµc
]
(e)
= 1− e−
µxrα
k
ηaµc
[
1 +
(1− η)µx
ηµc(Nt − Ld)
]−(Le−Lc)
,
(23)
where (e) holds for the integration formula [40, 3.326.2]. The
CDF of ξe can be calculated as
Fξe(x) = EΦe,{µc}
[ ∏
ek∈Φe
P {ξk < x}
]
= exp
{
−λ
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
Eµc
{[
1 +
(1 − η)µx
ηµc(Nt − Ld)
]−(Le−Lc)
×e−
µxrα
k
ηaµc
}
rkdθdrk
}
= exp
{
−πλΓ
(
2
α
+ 1
)(
µx
ηa
)− 2
α
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)
×Eµc
{[
1 +
(1− η)µx
ηµc(Nt − Ld)
]−(Le−Lc)( 1
µc
)− 2
α
}}
.
(24)
Denoting b , (1−η)µxη(Nt−Ld) yields
Fξe(x) = exp
{
−πλΓ
(
2
α
+ 1
)(
µx
ηa
)− 2
α
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)
×
∫ ∞
0
(µc + b)
−(Le−Lc)µLe−Lc+
2
α
c
µLc−1c
Γ(Lc)
e−µcdµc
}
(f)
= exp
{
−πλΓ
(
2
α
+ 1
)(
µx
ηa
)− 2
α
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)e
b
Γ(Lc)
×
∫ ∞
b
y−(Le−Lc)(y − b)Le+ 2α−1e−ydy
}
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(g)
= exp
{
−πλΓ
(
2
α
+ 1
)
Γ
(
2
α
+ Le
)(
µx
ηa
)− 2
α
×
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)e
b
2 b
Lc+
2
α
−1
2
Γ(Lc)
WLc−2Le− 2α+1
2 ,
−Lc−
2
α
2
(b)

 ,
(25)
where (f) follows from the variable transformation y = µc+b
and (g) holds for the integration formula [40, 3.383.4]. Since
the formula inside the mathematical expectation in (24) is a
convex function of 1µc , using Jensen’s inequality yields
Fξe(x) ≤ exp
{
−πλΓ
(
2
α
+ 1
)(
µx
ηa
)− 2
α
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)
×
[
1 +
(1− η)µx
η(Nt − Ld)Eµc
(
1
µc
)]−(Le−Lc) [
Eµc
(
1
µc
)]− 2
α
}
= exp
{
−πλΓ
(
2
α
+ 1
)(
µx
ηa
)− 2
α
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc) (Lc − 1)
2
α
×
[
1 +
(1− η)µx
η(Nt − Ld)(Lc − 1)
]−(Le−Lc)}
.
(26)
The above formula (26) gives an upper bound of Fξe(x). In
order to verify the accuracy of (26), we plot Fξe(x) in (26)
versus x for different values of η in Fig. 4. We find that the
upper-bound curves coincide well with simulation ones, and
they are very tight. Thus we use the result in (26) instead of
(25) in the following deductions.
Then the SOP of AN beamforming can be expressed as
Pso(µ) = 1− exp
{
−πλΓ
(
2
α
+ 1
)
×
{
µ[ηcµr−αd − (T − 1)]
ηaT
}− 2
α Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc) (Lc − 1)
2
α
×
[
1 +
µ(1 − η)[ηcµr−αd − (T − 1)]
ηT (Nt − Ld)(Lc − 1)
]−(Le−Lc)}
.
(27)
92) Colluding Eavesdroppers: In this scenario,
Pso(µ) = P{
∑
ek∈Φe
ηaµcr
−α
k
µ
u
(1−η)ar
−α
k
Nt−Ld
v+1
>
ηcµr−α
d
−(T−1)
T } =
P
{
Ie >
ηcµr−α
d
−(T−1)
T
}
, where Ie ,
∑
ek∈Φe
z2µcu
z3v+rαk
with
z2 ,
ηa
µ and z3 ,
(1−η)a
Nt−Ld . Then we derive a closed-form
expression for LIe(s) in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The Laplace transform of Ie can be given by
LIe(s) = exp
{
−πλΓ(1 + 2α)Γ(1− 2α)Γ(Le − 2α)
Γ(Le +
3
2 )
z−2α−13
×z2s
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)LcF
(
Lc + 1, 2α+ 1;Le +
3
2
;−sz2
z3
)}
.
(28)
Proof 6: Please see Appendix B.
Following Theorem 1, in the scenario of colluding eaves-
droppers, the SOP of AN beamforming can be approximated
as
Pso '
N∑
n=0
(
N
n
)
(−1)nLIe
(
qTn
ηcµr−αd − (T − 1)
)
. (29)
C. Secrecy Throughput Maximization and Optimal Power Al-
location
In this subsection, we optimize η to get a maximum secrecy
throughput under the SOP constraint for the AN scheme in the
non-colluding eavesdroppers scenario.
According to (18) and by denoting ρ(η) ,
F−1
ξe
(1−ǫ)
η for the
AN scheme, the optimization problem can be formulated as
max
η
Rs(µ) = log
1 + ηcµr−αd
1 + ηρ(η)
,
s.t. 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, ρ(η) < cµr−αd ,
(30)
where ρ(η) < cµr−αd is the transmission constraint of the on-
off transmission scheme that guarantees a positive Rs(µ).
Rewriting the definition formula of ρ(η) as
FANξe (ηρ(η)) = 1 − ǫ, we derive J(ρ) − Q = 0,
where J(ρ) , ρ−
2
α
∑Ll
Lc=1
z4[1 + z5(1 − η)ρ]−(Le−Lc)
and Q , − ln(1−ǫ)(µa )
2
α
πλΓ( 2
α
+1)
, with z4 , p(Lc)(Lc − 1) 2α ,
z5 ,
µ
(Nt−Ld)(Lc−1) . It is hard to get a analytical expression
of ρ(η) for the AN scheme. Instead, we investigate the
relationship between ρ(η) and η in the following lemma in
order to find an efficient way to calculate ρ with a given η.
Lemma 3: ρ(η) is a monotonically increasing and convex
function of η in the range η ∈ [0, 1].
Proof 7: Please see Appendix C.
From the definition of ρ, we easily obtain that ρ ≥ 0. Due to
Lamma 3, the maximum ρ is achieved at η = 1. Then we can
obtain ρmax = Q
−α2 (
∑Ll
Lc=1
z4)
α
2 from J(ρ) − Q = 0. We
define Ξ(ρ) , J(ρ)−1 −Q−1 = 0. Evidently, for an given η,
Ξ(ρ) is a monotonically increasing function of ρ. Since Ξ(0) =
−Q−1 < 0 and Ξ(ρmax) = Q−1{
∑Ll
Lc=1
z4{
∑Ll
Lc=1
z4[1 +
z5(1 − η)Q−α2 (
∑Ll
Lc=1
z4)
α
2 ]−(Le−Lc)}−1 − 1} ≥ 0, we find
that Ξ(ρ) has the unique zero-crossing point. Therefore, we
can obtain the unique root ρ of Ξ(ρ) = 0 by utilizing the
bisection method within the range [0, ρmax].
Theorem 3: Given ρ < cµr−αd , Rs is a concave function of
η. The optimal η∗ that maximizes Rs is given by
η∗ =


1,
cµr−αd
1 + cµr−αd
−
ρmax +
αµ
2(Nt−Ld)ρ
2
max
1 + ρmax
> 0,
η⋆, otherwise,
(31)
where η⋆ is the unique root of the following equation
dRs
dη
=
1
ln 2
(
cµr−αd
1 + ηcµr−αd
− ρ+ η
dρ
dη
1 + ηρ
)
= 0, (32)
with dρdη defined in (36).
Proof 8: Please see Appendix D.
The above theorem provides the solution of the optimization
problem (30), and supplies an efficient approach, i.e., the
bisection method, that can be used to search the optimal η⋆,
due to the concavity of Rs on η. Then we investigate how the
optimal power allocation ratio η⋆ varies in different scenarios
in the following corollary.
Corollary 3: The optimal η⋆ monotonically decreases with
λ and rd, and monotonically increases with ǫ.
Proof 9: Please see Appendix E.
Corollary 3 indicates that when the transmission is more
vulnerable to eavesdropping, i.e., with a poorer quality of the
destination’s channel, in a denser eavesdroppers scenario or
under a more rigorous SOP constraint, we should allocate
more power to AN.
Next, we calculate the transmission threshold δ. We have
already derived the transmission constraint ρ(η) < cµr−αd to
guarantee a positive Rs. Since ρ(η) monotonically increases
with η, if ρ(0), the minimum ρ(η), is not below cµr−αd , i.e.,
ρ(0) ≥ cµr−αd ⇒ µ ≤ r
α
d ρ(0)
c , the transmission constraint
ρ(η) < cµr−αd can not be satisfied. Hence we can not find
a feasible η to maintain the positivity of Rs. Therefore, µ >
rαd ρ(0)
c must be guaranteed, and as a consequence we set δ =
rαd ρ(0)
c , which corresponds to an on-off transmission, i.e., when
µ > δ, the transmitter radiates signals with R∗s(µ); otherwise,
the transmission suspends and we set Rs(µ) = 0.
From (5), the maximum secrecy throughput of AN beam-
forming can be given by
τ∗ =
∫ ∞
rα
d
ρ(0)
c
R∗s(µ)fµ(x)dx, (33)
where fµ(x) =
x(Ld−1)
Γ(Ld)
e−x.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are presented to verify our
theoretical analysis. The transmitter is equipped with an ULA
containing 100 antennas. We set the pass loss exponent α = 4
and the noise power σ2n = −60dBm [30], [33], [35].
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Fig. 5. Connection probability versus Ld for different rd’s, with P = 10dBm,
Rt = 6 and η = 0.8.
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Fig. 6. SOP versus Ld for different λ’s, with Nt = 100, P = 0dBm,
rd = 50m, Le = 20, η = 0.5 and Rs = 4.
A. Connection and Secrecy Outage Performance
Fig. 5 describes connection probability versus Ld for dif-
ferent values of rd. We find that when rd is small, connection
probability increases as the number of resolvable paths Ld
increases. The trend is opposite when rd is large. The under-
lying reason is that when the number of paths becomes larger,
the influence of paths with either very high or very low gain
becomes weaker, i.e., the received power is closer to its mean
and the randomness is smaller. When rd is small, the mean
of SNR is high. Therefore, with the increase of Ld, SNR is
closer to its higher mean and the connection probability will
increase. Otherwise, when rd is large, SNR approaches to its
lower mean and the connection probability will decrease. We
also observe that connection probability of AN beamforming
is lower than that of MRT beamforming due to the fact that
partial transmit power is allocated to the AN transmission.
Fig. 6 presents Pso versus Ld for different values of λ. As
shown in the figure, Pso is higher in colluding eavesdroppers
scenario than that in non-colluding eavesdroppers scenario.
The differences are more obvious when eavesdroppers are
denser. For both AN beamforming and MRT beamforming,
Pso decreases when Ld reduces. The underlying reason is
that when the number of the destination’s resolvable paths
Ld drops, the information signal is transmitted through fewer
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Fig. 7. Optimal power allocation ratio η∗ versus Ld for different rd’s, with
Nt = 100, P = 10dBm, Le = 20, λ = 5× 10−6 and ǫ = 0.01.
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Fig. 8. Optimal power allocation ratio η∗ versus λ for different Le’s, with
Nt = 100, P = 10dBm, Ld = 20, rd = 50m and ǫ = 0.01.
directions, which leads to a lower chance of confidential
message leakage.
B. Optimal Power Allocation of AN Beamforming
Fig. 7 investigates the optimal power allocation ratio η∗
that maximizes the secrecy throughput versus Ld for different
values of rd. we find that η
∗ increases with the decrease of
rd. The figure also shows that for a given Le = 20, when Ld
varies from 10 to 30, η∗ is getting smaller. It is because that
when Ld becomes larger, the transmit beam of the information
signals covers more spatially resolvable directions, so that
eavesdroppers’ resolvable paths are more likely to fall into
that beam, which means that eavesdroppers will receive more
information signals. Thus we should give a larger fraction of
transmit power to AN transmission in order to interfere with
eavesdroppers.
Fig. 8 plots the optimal power allocation ratio η∗ that
maximizes the secrecy throughput versus λ for different values
of Le. As shown in the figure, η
∗ decreases as λ increases,
which implies that we should increase AN power when secure
transmissions become more vulnerable to intercepting. In
addition, the value of η∗ falls down with an increase in Le. The
underlying reason is that when Le becomes larger, resolvable
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Fig. 9. Optimal power allocation ratio η∗ versus P for different ǫ’s, with
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paths of eavesdroppers and those of the destination are more
likely to overlap, and then eavesdroppers are able to wiretap
more confidential messages. Therefore, more power is ought
to be allocated to AN transmission in order to deteriorate
eavesdroppers’ channels.
Fig. 9 illustrates the optimal power allocation ratio η∗
that maximizes the secrecy throughput versus P for different
values of ǫ. η∗ keeps 1 at the low transmit power region
and then drops as P increases, which implies that we should
transmit information signals with full power to achieve a
higher message rate at the low power regime and give a larger
fraction of power to AN transmission when the transmit power
becomes higher. We also find that for a given transmit power
P , as ǫ decreases, η∗ decreases.
C. Secrecy Throughput Performance
Fig. 10 describes the secrecy throughput versus Ld for
different values of rd. Secrecy throughput becomes higher
with the decrease of rd, which confirms the fact that a better
destination’s channel contributes to a promotion of secrecy
throughput. We also find that the secrecy throughput increases
as Ld decreases. The underlying reason is that confidential
signals are radiated through all the directions of the destina-
tion’s resolvable paths. In the small Ld scenario, the transmit
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Fig. 11. Secrecy throughput versus Le for different λ’s, with Nt = 100,
P = 10dBm, Ld = 20, rd = 50m and ǫ = 0.01.
beam which contains secrecy messages is narrow. It is hard for
eavesdroppers to intercept. Therefore, smaller Ld is beneficial
for enhancing the secrecy throughput.
Fig. 11 presents the secrecy throughput versus Le for
different values of λ. We observe that the secrecy throughput
increases with a smaller λ for both transmission schemes,
which indicates that secrecy performance improves in a sparse
eavesdropper scenario. As the number of the eavesdropper’s
resolvable paths Le changes, the variation tendencies of MRT
beamforming and AN beamforming are different. For MRT
beamforming, the secrecy throughput turns to be lower as
Le increases. It is because that in the large Le situation,
eavesdroppers’ resolvable paths are more likely to cover
the destination’s resolvable paths in which directions the
information signals emit. Thus eavesdroppers overhear more
secrecy messages and the secrecy performance will be poorer.
Although a heavier leakage to eavesdroppers also happens in
the AN beamforming case when Le grows, the transmitter
gives more power to AN transmission as shown in Fig. 8, so
that the interference received by eavesdroppers increases too.
With the transmission of AN, the SINR of eavesdroppers may
drop. Therefore, the results in the figure show that the secrecy
throughput increases when Le increases for the AN scheme.
In addition, we observe that the gap between the secrecy
throughput of AN beamforming and that of MRT beamforming
is more evident in the denser eavesdropper scenario.
Fig. 12 describes the secrecy throughput versus P for
different values of ǫ. Obviously, by increasing transmit power
P , the secrecy throughput increases. We also see that MRT
beamforming presents a comparable performance to AN beam-
forming in the low transmit power scenario. As revealed in
Corollary 2, the secrecy throughput of MRT beamforming
at the high transmit power regime converges to a constant
which is irrespective to P . However, since more power is
allocated to the AN transmission to confuse eavesdroppers as
shown in Fig. 9, the secrecy throughput of AN beamforming
keeps increasing, and the superiority of AN beamforming
becomes more obvious. Meanwhile, as the increase of the SOP
constraint threshold ǫ, the secrecy throughput becomes higher.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has comprehensively studied secure transmis-
sions in millimeter wave systems where the locations of
eavesdroppers are modeled as an independent homogeneous
PPP. We have established a discrete angular domain channel
model which characterized by spatially resolvable paths to
facilitate the theoretical design and analysis of secure trans-
mission schemes. Then we have evaluated the performance
of MRT beamforming and AN beamforming by obtaining the
connection probability, the SOP and the secrecy throughput.
Particularly, we have derived the optimal power allocation
between AN and the information signal that maximizes the
secrecy throughput for AN beamforming. Through our analy-
sis, we have revealed that the superiority of AN beamforming
over MRT beamforming is highly significant in dense eaves-
droppers scenario, at the high transmit power regime or in
the situation that the number of the eavesdropper’s spatially
resolvable paths is large.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Since µ ∼ Gamma(Ld, 1), the PDF of µ can be given
by fµ(x) =
x(Ld−1)
Γ(Ld)
e−x. By substituting (19), we derive the
maximum secrecy throughput of MRT beamforming as
τ∗ =
∫ ∞
δ
R∗s(x)fµ(x)dx
(h)
=
∫ ∞
0
1
Γ(Ld)
log
(y + δ)[1 + cr−αd (y + δ)]
y + δ + z1
× (y + δ)Ld−1e−(y+δ)dy
=
e−δ
Γ(Ld)
Ld−1∑
m=0
(
Ld − 1
m
)
δLd−1−m
∫ ∞
0
[
log(1 +
1
δ
y)
+ log(1 +
cr−αd
1 + cr−αd δ
y)− log(1 + 1
δ + z1
y)
+ log
δ(1 + cr−αd δ)
δ + z1
]
yme−ydy,
(34)
where (h) holds for the transformation y = x− δ. According
to [40, 4.337.5], the final result shown in (20) is obtained.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
LIe(s) = EΦe,u,v,µc
[
e
−s∑ek∈Φe
z2µcu
z3v+r
α
k
]
= exp
{
−2πλ
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)Eu,v,µc
[∫ ∞
0
[1
− exp
(
−s z2µcu
z3v + rαk
)]
rkdrk
]}
= exp
{
−2πλ
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
sz2µc
×(rαk + sz2µc + z3v)−1rkdrkf(v)f(µc)dvdµc
}
(i)
= exp
{
−πλΓ(1 + 2α)Γ(1 − 2α)
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)
×
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
sz2µc(sz2µc + z3v)
−2α−1f(v)f(µc)dvdµc
}
(j)
= exp
{
−πλΓ(1 + 2α)Γ(1− 2α)z−
Le−Lc
2 −α
3 (sz2)
Le−Lc
2 −α
×
Ll∑
Lc=1
p(Lc)
∫ ∞
0
µ
Le−Lc
2 −α
c e
sz2µc
2z3
×W−Le+Lc
2 −α, 1−Le+Lc2 +α
(
sz2µc
z3
)
f(µc)dµc
}
,
(35)
where f(u) = e−u, f(v) = v
(Le−Lc−1)
Γ(Le−Lc) e
−v and f(µc) =
µ(Lc−1)c
Γ(Lc)
e−µc are PDFs of u, v and µc respectively, (i) holds
for the transformation x = rαk and the integration formula
[40, 3.194], (j) holds for the transformation y = z3v+ sz2µc
and the integration formula [40, 3.383.4]. By utilizing the
integration formula [40, 7.621.3], we obtain the result in (28).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
The first-order and second-order derivatives of ρ(η) can be
given by
dρ
dη
= −∂J/∂η
∂J/∂ρ
=
ρ2
ρ(1 − η) + 2ασ
, (36)
d2ρ
dη2
=
2
ρ
(
dρ
dη
)2
+
ρ2[ς − 2α dσdη ]
[ρ(1− η) + 2ασ]2
, (37)
where σ ,
∑Ll
Lc=1
z4[1+z5(1−η)ρ]−(Le−Lc)
∑Ll
Lc=1
z4z5(Le−Lc)[1+z5(1−η)ρ]−(Le−Lc)−1
, and
ς , ρ − (1 − η) dρdη . Since σ > 0, obviously, dρdη > 0. By
substituting (36), we have ς =
2
α
σρ
ρ(1−η)+ 2
α
σ
> 0. Denoting
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C1 ,
∑Ll
Lc=1
z4z5(Le − Lc)[1 + z5(1 − η)ρ]−(Le−Lc)−1 and
C2 ,
∑Ll
Lc=1
z4[1 + z5(1 − η)ρ]−(Le−Lc), we have
dσ
dη
=
dC2
dη
C1
−
C2
dC1
dη
C21
=
1
C21
{C1
Ll∑
Lc=1
z4z5(Le − Lc)[1 + z5(1− η)ρ]−(Le−Lc)−1ς
− C2
Ll∑
Lc=1
z4z
2
5(Le − Lc)(Le − Lc + 1)
× [1 + z5(1− η)ρ]−(Le−Lc)−2ς}
<
ς
C21
{C21 − C2C3}
(k)
≤ 0,
(38)
where C3 ,
∑Ll
Lc=1
z4z
2
5(Le−Lc)2[1+z5(1−η)ρ]−(Le−Lc)−2
and (k) holds for the Holder’s inequality (
∑
xy)2 ≤
(
∑
x2)(
∑
y2) with x = {z4[1 + z5(1− η)ρ]−(Le−Lc)} 12 and
y = {z4z25(Le−Lc)2[1+ z5(1− η)ρ]−(Le−Lc)−2}
1
2 . Thus we
have that d
2ρ
dη2 >
2
ρ
(
dρ
dη
)2
> 0. With dρdη > 0 and
d2ρ
dη2 > 0, we
complete the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The second-order derivative of Rs can be described as
d2Rs
dη2
= − 1
ln 2
{
(cµr−αd )
2
(1 + ηcµr−αd )2
+
1
(1 + ηρ)2
×
[
(1 + ηρ)
(
2
dρ
dη
+ η
d2ρ
dη2
)
−
(
ρ+ η
dρ
dη
)2]}
,
(39)
with dρdη and
d2ρ
dη2 given by (36) and (37). Substituting
d2ρ
dη2 >
2
ρ
(
dρ
dη
)2
> 0 (see Appendix C) into the above equation yields
d2Rs
dη2 < − 1ln 2
[
(cµr−α
d
)2
(1+ηcµr−α
d
)2
− ρ2(1+ηρ)2
]
. Since cµr−αd > ρ, we
have d
2Rs
dη2 < 0, i.e., Rs is a concave function of η.
For the concavity of Rs, the maximum value of Rs is
achieved either at the boundaries or at the zero-crossing point
of dRsdη . From the first-order derivative formula of Rs in (32),
we obtain dRsdη |η=0 = 1ln 2 (cµr−αd − ρ) > 0 and dRsdη |η=1 =
1
ln 2
{
cµr−α
d
1+cµr−α
d
− ρmax+
αµ
2(Nt−Ld)
ρ2max
1+ρmax
}
. If dRsdη |η=1 > 0, Rs
monotonically increases with η, and the optimal value of η is
1 with the condition directly obtained from dRsdη |η=1 > 0. If
dRs
dη |η=1 ≤ 0, Rs first increases and then decreases, and the
optimal value of η is the unique root of dRsdη .
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
Substituting (36) into (32) and denoting cˆ , cµr−αd yield
(cˆη2 + 1)ρ2 + (cˆη +
2
α
σ − cˆ)ρ− 2
α
σcˆ = 0. (40)
Denote the left side of the above equation as Y , we obtain
∂Y
∂η
= z6
dρ
dη
+
2
α
(ρ− cˆ)dσ
dη
+ 2cˆηρ2 + cˆρ > 0, (41)
where z6 , 2cˆη2ρ+ 2ρ+ cˆη + 2ασ − cˆ. By substituting (40),
we have z6 = ρ+ cˆη
2ρ+ 2α cˆσ
1
ρ > 0. From ρ < cˆ and
dσ
dη < 0,
we derive ∂Y∂η > 0.
1) λ: dηdλ = −∂Y/∂λ∂Y/∂η = −
z6
dρ
dλ
∂Y/∂η , where z6 > 0 and
∂Y
∂η > 0.
From the definition of Ξ, we find Ξ = 0, ∂Ξ∂ρ > 0 and
∂Ξ
∂λ < 0,
hence dρdλ = −∂Ξ/∂λ∂Ξ/∂ρ > 0. Thus we derive dηdλ < 0.
2) ǫ: dηdǫ = − ∂Y/∂ǫ∂Y/∂η = −
z6
dρ
dǫ
∂Y/∂η , where z6 > 0 and
∂Y
∂η > 0.
Since ∂Ξ∂ǫ > 0 , we have
dρ
dǫ = − ∂Ξ/∂ǫ∂Ξ/∂ρ < 0. Thus we obtain
dη
dǫ > 0.
3) rd:
dη
drd
= −∂Y/∂rd∂Y/∂η = −
∂Y
∂cˆ
dcˆ
drd
∂Y/∂η , where
dcˆ
drd
< 0 and
∂Y
∂η > 0. Since
∂Y
∂cˆ = η
2ρ2 + ηρ − ρ − 2ασ, substituting (40)
yields ∂Y∂cˆ = −(ρ2 + 2ασρ)1cˆ < 0. Thus we obtain dηdrd < 0.
With 1)-3), we complete the proof.
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